Runway Incursions: Causes and Mitigation Strategies

DALLAS — In the fast-paced world of commercial aviation, runway incursions have become an increasingly alarming concern. We take a closer look at the underlying causes and the innovative mitigation strategies being implemented to ensure safer airports.

The collision of a Japan Airlines (JL) Airbus A350 with a Japanese Coast Guard De Havilland Canada Dash-8 cargo plane at Tokyo Haneda Airport (HND) is the latest case of a runway incursion with tragic consequences.

Beyond the immediate devastation and loss of life, the JL516 crash starkly highlights the dangers of runway incursions, prompting rigorous investigations and a renewed focus on mitigating these critical safety threats.

Causes of Runway Incursions

Pilot Deviations:

• Misunderstanding or misinterpreting instructions: A clear communication breakdown between air traffic controllers (ATCs) and pilots can lead to confusion and erroneous actions. Lack of clear clearances, ambiguous phraseology, or pilot fatigue can contribute to unintentional runway incursions.
• Spatial disorientation: In low-visibility conditions or during complex approaches, pilots can lose situational awareness. Misperception of runway location, markings, or lighting can lead to inadvertent entry onto the wrong runway or taxiway.
• Procedural errors: Failure to follow established procedures, such as taxiing routes, holding points, or clearance limitations, can lead to unintended incursions.

Operational Errors:

• ATC errors: While rare, ATC mistakes like issuing conflicting instructions, misidentifying aircraft, or clearing an aircraft onto an occupied runway can have catastrophic consequences.
• Ground vehicle errors: Improper positioning of ground vehicles like tugs, fuel trucks, or baggage loaders on the runway or taxiways can pose significant collision risks. Lack of training, communication lapses, or inadequate procedures for ground crews can contribute to such errors.
• Runway contamination: Foreign objects or debris on the runway can force pilots to take evasive maneuvers, potentially leading to incursions. Inadequate maintenance or foreign object debris (FOD) control procedures can be contributing factors.

Communication Issues:

• Language barriers: Miscommunication between ATC and pilots speaking different languages can lead to misunderstandings and incorrect actions. Clear language protocols and phraseology training are crucial to ensuring unambiguous communication.
• Equipment malfunctions: Malfunctioning communication equipment or navigation systems can hinder communication and situational awareness, leading to potential incursions. Proper maintenance and redundancy systems are essential to prevent equipment failures.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PictAt-0J4M&t=61s&pp=ygUQYWlyd2F5cyBtYWdhemluZQ%3D%3D

Japan Airlines 516 Crash

Tokyo Haneda Airport's Taxiway C5 enters runway 34R. According to a transcript of communications just before the crash released Wednesday by Japanese officials in Tokyo, HDN's Air Traffic Controllers (ATC) informed the JL Airbus A350 that it was "Clear to RUNWAY 34R JAL516" before immediately instructing the Coast Guard Dash-8 to "taxi to holding point C5."

The transcript reveals that the Dash 8 flight crew acknowledged the holding instruction eight seconds after receiving the request from ATC. The flight crew responded, "Taxi to holding point C5 JA722A No. 1, Thank you," as per the readout.

The above contradicts the Coast Guard captain's claim that he had permission to take off. Why the Dash-8 continued to taxi into the runway is still a mystery. We also do not know if it was the captain or the co-pilot (who unfortunately died in the crash) who was speaking with the tower.

A seasoned pilot we spoke to who has flown into HDN many times—most recently a few weeks ago—says the Japanese controllers are normally on the ball. "The Dash 8 was based there, so it was familiar territory for the crew, too. I am at a loss to even guess what went on."

There is also the issue of the stop-bar lights on the HDN intersections leading to the runway being non-functional since December 27. These lights are responsible for visually indicating whether the runway is clear or not to pilots.

According to a Bloomberg report, a Notice to Air Missions (NOTAM) was issued, stating that the lights on all intersections leading to the specific runway in question were currently out of service, which the Dash-8 pilot would have known before taking off.

Regardless, the Dash-8 was not cleared to enter the runway and should have therefore been held short at taxiway C5. Only after the official investigation findings are made public will we know what happened Tuesday evening at runway 34R.

Holding Short

Holding short of the runway means to wait, to stay away from a taxiway centerline or a runway. It means pilots must stop so that no part of the aircraft extends beyond the holding position marking.

While some pilots might say that ATC won't tell you to hold short on an active runway unless it's not very busy, which is not the case at HND, ATC in most places are normally very good at making clear if you are allowed to taxi onto the runway or not.

If they tell you to hold short, you will receive instructions to navigate to a specific location, which could be a point, a taxiway, or a runway. The pilot follows the designated route and comes to a stop just before reaching the assigned point, taxiway, or runway.

If it's a runway, he or she makes sure to remain behind the hold short bars. If it's a taxiway, the pilot maintains a safe distance to allow other aircraft to use the taxiway.

You can read more about pre-flight briefing with the flight crews in our deep dive, How Flight Dispatchers Ensure Flight Safety.

Mitigating Runway Incursions

• Enhanced training: Thorough and regular training for pilots, ATCs, and ground crews on procedures, communication protocols, and threat identification is critical.
• Safety technology: Implementation of runway incursion prevention systems (RIPS), enhanced lighting systems, and improved signage can provide additional layers of protection.
• Standardized procedures: Clear and consistent operational procedures across airports and aviation organizations can minimize confusion and reduce error risks.
• Continuous monitoring and analysis: Monitoring and analyzing runway incursion data helps identify trends, patterns, and potential contributing factors. This information can then be used to implement targeted corrective measures.

Effectiveness of Mitigation Strategies

• Runway Incursion Prevention Systems (RIPS): Research indicates that RIPS, which utilize ground radars and alerts to warn pilots and ATCs of potential incursions, have significantly reduced the rate of serious runway incursions. Their wider implementation is encouraged.
• Improved signage and markings: Unambiguous runway and taxiway markings can reduce pilot confusion and improve situational awareness. Standardized color coding and lighting schemes further enhance visual distinction.
• Standardized taxi procedures: Implementing consistent taxiing routes and holding points across airports minimizes deviation risks and promotes adherence to established procedures.

Advancements in Technology and Procedures

It's crucial to remember that no single solution is foolproof. A multi-layered approach combining technological advancements, robust procedures, and continuous training for all personnel involved in airport operations is necessary to help mitigate the risk of runway incursions. Some recent advancements include:

• Runway Awareness and Advisory System (RAAS): The RAAS is one of several related software enhancements available on later-model Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Systems. RAAS is designed to improve flight crew situational awareness, thereby reducing the risks of runway incursion, runway confusion, and runway excursions.
• Airbus' On-board Airport Navigation System (OANS): The OANS system, developed by Airbus in conjunction with Thales, presents pilots with an overview map display of the airport apron and taxiways, coupled with a new interactive input device to indicate the aircraft's location on that map. Ironically, the JL A350 would have had it, but it would not have helped them in this case since the system provides navigation assistance on the ground.
• Flight deck design improvements: According to Boeing, flight deck design improvements can reduce the risk of runway incursion, confusion, and excursion, resulting in safer and more efficient taxi, takeoff, approach, and landing operations. Figures 5 and onwards on this link show the most recent kits that Boeing is developing.
• Enhanced Ground Radars: The development of next-generation radars with improved accuracy and real-time tracking capabilities can provide more precise information about aircraft positions on the ground, leading to more effective incursion warnings.
• Machine Learning for Risk Assessment: Utilizing machine learning algorithms to analyze historical data and identify patterns in runway incursion events can predict and prevent future occurrences through targeted interventions.
• Standardized Crew Resource Management (CRM): Emphasizing effective communication and teamwork within cockpits and between pilots and ATCs can help identify and manage potential errors before they lead to incursions.

Regarding the last point, JL516 had a total of 367 passengers and 12 crew members on board. All 379 passengers and crew members were safely evacuated after the plane caught fire during the landing and collided with the Japan Coast Guard aircraft, which only had one survivor out of the six passengers on board. Our deepest condolences go to all those affected.

In terms of effective flight attendant teamwork and cabin procedures, we applaud the JL516 crew and passengers who carried out the evacuation with professionalism in such trying circumstances.

To learn more about how flight crews safely evacuate passengers in under 90 seconds, check out our latest article on the evolution of cabin safety.

Featured image: Alaska Airlines (AS) E175 N651QX taxis for departure while the Boeing 737-900ER version of that scheme, N265AK, waits to cross the active for its gate. Also, we have a Delta Air Lines (DL) E175, operated by Skywest (OO), departing from 16L. Photo: Brandon Farris/Airways

https://airwaysmag.com/evolution-modern-cabin-safety/