DALLAS — NTSB chair Jennifer Homendy called for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to propose an increase in the cockpit voice recording time from the current 2 hours to 25 hours on all planes in the air, not just newly manufactured ones.

On the first full day of the investigation, the NTSB groups looked at the structure, system operations, and survival factors of the Alaska Airlines (AS) Boeing 737-9.

NTSB chair Homendy began the day's report by stating that the structure group documented the left plug surround structure for any deformations and witnessed marks, paint transfer, and other components to send back to the lab to check for any fractures, sheering, or deformation under the microscope. The structure group will look at the plug on the right side of the aircraft tomorrow.

Regarding the ongoing search for the door plug, it was found in Portland, Oregon, on Sunday night. The section was discovered in the backyard of a school teacher known as "Bob." Homendy expressed gratitude to the teacher and confirmed that he had contacted the agency and provided photos of the section. NTSB officials are collecting the portion, which Homendy said appeared to be legitimate.

The NTSB described the missing aircraft part. It is characterized as having a yellow-green color on one side and white on the other. The dimensions of the door plug measure 26 by 48 inches. Homendy also expressed appreciation for the community's efforts in finding a cell phone and urged business owners to inspect their roofs.

Systems Operations

The flight operations group thoroughly documented the entire flight deck and inquired about the auto-pressurization fail light that had turned on three previous flights. The incidents occurred on November 7, January 3, and January 4. The pilots followed the standard procedure of resetting the system by flipping the switch and reporting the illumination.

Although these incidents were considered "benign" according to the AS report, the NTSB is investigating whether there is any correlation between the illumination of the auto-pressurization fail light and the accident involving Flight 1282. AS decided not to allow the aircraft to fly to Hawaii, giving it time to return to the departing airport if necessary.

The NTSB will be looking into the reasons behind AS's decision not to fly the aircraft over the Pacific Ocean.

Survival Factors

The survival factors group documented damage to the interior of the aircraft that was from the impact of the explosive decompression. There was a lot of damage to the panel, the trim, and the internal portion of the windows (the plastic portion). The team documented the damage that was found in rows 33, 32, 31, 27, 26, 25, 12, 11, 4, 3, 2, and 1.

There was damage to seats 26 and 25 and their headrests. The seats were contorted and missing trays and seatbacks, so the team pulled those seats out to take a closer look. The survival factors team also looked at the exterior of the aircraft and verified that there was no structural damage to the aircraft.

During the explosive decompression, the cockpit door flew open, hitting the lavatory door, which got stuck due to the blow, and an FA was able to shut the cockpit door on the third try. The NTSB interviewed the flight crew. They heard a band and immediately put on their oxygen masks, just as the cockpit door flew open. The laminated quick reference list flew out, so the captain handed the quick reference handbook to the First Officer (FO), and they started going through their memory items.

The captain and FO headsets were pulled off, so they turned on the speaker to communicate with the cabin. Communication became a serious issue between FAs and the flight deck. At the moment of the rapid decompression, the cabin became chaotic, loud, and violent when the plug was expelled out of the plane. The NTSB commends the actions of the flight crew.

A Call to Increase CVR Recording Time

The NTSB sent the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder (FDR) to their labs. They will use data from the FDR to narrow down the area to search for the door plug. However, the CVR was completely overwritten, meaning there is nothing on the CVR. The CVR overwrites every two hours. This has happened before in previous runway incursion incidents.

The Chair said the NTSB has "many times talked about the need to increase the time on CVRs from 2 hours to 25 hours, which is consistent with Europe and many other countries. The FAA has taken recent action to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking for such a time extension, but only on newly manufactured aircraft. The planes that are in service now have a life cycle of 40 to 50 years, meaning those planes will not have the time extension on their CVRs."

The NTSB Chair stressed that CVRs are critical to helping them accurately pinpoint what was going on. It is key to safety to know what is happening in the cockpit during an aircraft incident or accident. She recalled the maxim: Aviate, navigate, and communicate, adding that if that communication was not recorded, it was a loss for us, a loss for the FAA, and a loss for aviation safety."

The NTSB Chair was adamant when stating that the NTSB was "making comments on the FAA's rulemaking, calling for 25-hour CVRs in not just new aircraft but retrofitting aircraft, and if the FAA won't do it, we hope Congress will take action in the FAA reauthorization bill to ensure that it does. I cannot emphasize enough how important that is for safety."

The CVR recording time used to be just 30 minutes.

Featured image: Investigator-in-charge John Lovell examines the fuselage plug area of Alaska Airlines Flight 1282, Boeing 737-9 MAX. Photo: NTSB